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In her seminal text, What Should We Do With Our Brain? (2008), 
Catherine Malabou gestured towards neuroplasticity to upend 
Bergson’s famous parallel of  the brain as a “central telephonic 
exchange,”1 whereby the function of  the brain is simply that of  a 
node where perceptions get in touch with motor mechanisms—the 
brain as an instrument limited to the transmission and divisions 
of  movements. Indeed, drawing from the history of  cybernetics 
one can trace how Bergson’s ‘telephonic exchange’ prefigures the 
neural ‘cybernetic metaphor.’ It is elsewhere, however, that What 
Should We Do With Our Brain? finds its crux: inspired by Hegel’s 
fundamental opposition between plasticity and flexibility (“[p]last-
icity is the way in which time shapes or fashions us, constitutes our 
subjectivity and at the same time allows for resistance”),2 Malabou 
invalidated the ‘telephonic exchange’ metaphor for failing to take 
into account synaptic and neuronal vitality. Bolstered by neurolo-
gist Marc Jeannerod’s research in The Nature of  Mind (2002), Mala-
bou further demonstrated that the “cybernetic metaphor has also 
had its day.”3 The discovery of  plasticity in brain function had ar-
1  Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory trans. Nancy M. Paul et al. (Lon-
don: George Allen and Unwin, 1911), 10.
2  Catherine Malabou. “The Future of  Plasticity.” Interview by Kate 
Lawless. Chiasma 3.1, (2016), 99-108. 
3  Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain, trans. Sebas-
tian Rand (New York: Fordhan University Press, 2008), 34.
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guably rendered physico-mathematical comparisons between the 
computer and brain obsolete. Malabou, accounting for suppleness, 
demonstrated that the human brain possesses a certain “margin 
of  improvisation, of  creation, of  the aleatory”4 that the cybernetic 
model simply could not account for.
New Wounded (2012) and Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Ratio-
nality (2015) found Malabou qualifying speculative realism vis-a-vis 
plasticity and staunchly adhering to the Kantian transcendental 
in a post-Deleuzian moment when the likes of  Laruellean ‘non-
standard philosophy’ and Quentin Meillassoux’s ‘contingency’ 
veered sharply from Kant’s transcendental deduction. However, 
while Kant still looms in Malabou’s shadows, particularly via epi-
genetic ontology and the biologization of  the transcendental, it is a 
former concern—the relationship between automaticity and (cre-
ative) autonomy—that she returns to in her newest book, Morphing 
Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains (2019). 
Recalling Hegel’s assertion of  “constant transformation,”5 
in a seminar on Malabou and the “commerce of  being,” Alexander 
Galloway once remarked that, given its marked position towards 
the universal, “the only true plasticity is the one that is changing 
into its opposite.”6 Consequently, just as plasticity speaks to an 
ethical imperative to change,7 Malabou’s intervention is equally 
morphological. In her newest text we find a profound admission: 
“I was indeed mistaken in What Should We Do with Our Brain?: plas-
ticity is not, as I argued then, the opposite of  the machine, the 
determining element that stops us from equating the brain with a 
computer.”8 
4  Ibid., 35.
5  G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of  History, trans. J. Sibree (London: Co-
lonial Press, 1900), 121-122.
6  Alexander Galloway, “Catherine Malabou, or The Commerce in 
Being,” French Theory Today: An Introduction to Possible Futures (class lecture, The 
Public School, New York, NY, October 25, 2010), 3. http://cultureandcom-
munication.org/galloway/FTT/French-Theory-Today.pdf. Retrieved on May 
21, 2019.
7  Ibid., 5
8  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to 
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Why this marked and profound deviation from Malabou’s 
initial riven opposition between the structural identity of  cyber-
netic arrangements and the brain? For this, Malabou is partially 
indebted to historian David Bates’ research on artificial intelli-
gence, cognition, and epistemology as articulated in the anthology 
Plasticity and Pathology: On the Formation of  the Neural Subject (2016). 
Bates inaugurates his chapter, “Automaticity, Plasticity, and the De-
viant Origins of  Artificial Intelligence,” with the conviction that 
“[t]he contemporary brain is largely a digital brain.”9 Gesturing 
towards the field of  computational developmental neuroscience 
and Donald Hebb’s seminal theory of  synaptic connections (the 
oft-quoted axiom that “neurons that fire together wire together”),10 
Bates demonstrates that the brain is figured as a learning machine 
that “automatically constructs, according to set algorithms, con-
nective webs that are dependent on the specific ‘experience’ of  the 
network.”11 Thus, the imbrication of  automatism and plasticity 
does not robotize plasticity but, instead, unfetters mechanization 
from the bondage of  structural determinism. 
However, Malabou does not choose to pursue plasticity as 
the mediation between determinism/materialism and “pure free-
dom,” or as a “negative transformation” of  dialectic conjunctions 
between Marxist mutual relations.12 Rather, her critical pursuit 
is in making sense of  ‘intelligence’ as a descriptor for both ma-
chine and human intelligence. Given that today’s neural nets, deep 
learning and predictive processing algorithms are increasingly at-
tributed ‘intelligence,’ Malabou traces the term’s historical use as 
Artificial Brains, trans. Carolyn Shread (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2019), 113.
9   David Bates, “Automaticity, Plasticity, and the Deviant Origins of  
Artificial Intelligence,“ in Plasticity and Pathology: On the Formation of  the Neural 
Subject, ed. Nima Bassiri (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 196.
10  Carla J. Shatz, “The Developing Brain,” Scientific American 267.3 
(1992), 60–7.
11  Ibid., 197.
12   Catherine Malabou. “A Conversation with Catherine Malabou.” 
Interview by Noëlle Vahanian. Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 9.1 (July 
2007), 13.
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a scalar apparatus.
Malabou begins with IQ tests and metric scales, working up 
to an audit of  today’s synaptic chips. Unfurling the historical con-
flation between intelligence and genetic fate, Malabou reproaches 
the early construction of  ‘hereditarianism’ in Alfred Binet and 
Theodore Simon’s work on adaptive testing, reminding us how “[i]
ntelligence tests thus became an instrument of  biopolitics.”13 
In 1912, with psychologist William Stern’s Intelligenz-Quo-
tient, the term IQ appeared in the Anglo-American world.14 In 
England, soon thereafter, Charles Spearman and Cyril Burt de-
veloped the ‘correlational’ method via the ‘g factor’.15 Indeed, as 
psychometrics presented a particularized method for the measure 
of  a dubious and unspecified ‘genius,’ in turn it sought to uncover 
a generalized ‘intelligence’ that was dismally plunged into irreme-
diable ambiguity. This could be reduced to the reifying tautology 
that “‘IQ works becomes it measures g,’ and ‘g works because it 
legitimates IQ testing.’”16
Yet, as Malabou eruditely notes, the true biopolitical per-
version dormant in Binet’s metric scale is neither dependent on 
“g searching for itself,” nor on the idea of  an IQ score (initially 
founded as an innocuous “practical device”).17 Instead, no matter 
how it is defined, ‘g’ is propped up by a genealogical obsession with 
heredity. Malabou recounts how early IQ testing is responsible for 
transforming intelligence into something representable as “a sin-
gle, scalable thing in the head called general intelligence”18 and 
describes how its ideological appropriation resulted in eugenicist 
trajectories.19
13  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 30.
14  William Stern, The Psychological Methods of  Testing Intelligence (Balti-
more: Warwick & York, 1912).
15  Charles Spearman, The Abilities of  Man: Their Nature and Measurement 
(London: Macmillan, 1927).
16   Stephen Gould, The Mismeasure of  Man (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1996), 294.
17  Ibid., 185.
18  Ibid.
19  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 32.
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Admittedly, Theodore Binet, himself, declined to label IQ 
as inborn intelligence, greatly feared that his ‘practical device,’ if  
reified, could be used as an indelible label that postures towards 
self-fulfilling prophesies. Malabou notes that, despite Binet’s be-
nevolent intentions—to carve a guide for identifying children who 
needed help —he failed to recognize a veiled fallacy where that 
which is ‘heritable’ is trussed by inevitability. 
Malabou meticulously maps how intelligence testing even-
tually found a theoretical home in behavior genetics. Following ex-
perimental psychologist Francis Galton’s application of  Darwin’s 
natural selection to intelligence,20 early 20th century researchers 
sought to establish direct causal relations between genes and be-
havior. When biologists John Fuller and Robert Thompson pub-
lished their seminal 1960 study, Behavior Genetics, the field standard-
ized the convention of  dissecting human behavior alongside the 
core traits of  “intelligence, aggression, addictive behavior, and 
homosexuality.”21 Such psychometric comparisons reinforced the-
oretical, economic and ideological connections between behavior 
genetics and a burgeoning eugenics movement while initiating the 
enterprise of  dissecting behavior a posteriori. 
By the mid-1960s a theoretical consensus emerged wherein 
genetic determinism subsumed the development of  a total causal 
phenotype. It was not until as recent as 1994, when psychologist 
Richard Herrnstein and political scientist Charles Murray pub-
lished The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, 
that the intelligence quotient was popularized as a barometer in-
formed by both hereditary and environmental factors.22 Thus, the ‘g 
factor’ was eventually disrobed, revealed as a scientific hoax. Para-
doxically, in fact, it was the Human Genome Project’s revelation 
of  ‘noncoding’ DNA that revealed how “everything was not writ-
20  Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry Into Its Laws and Conse-
quences (London: MacMillan and Co., 1869).
21  John L. Fuller et al., Behavior Genetics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1960).
22  Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence 
and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1994).
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ten in DNA sequences even at the molecular and cellular level,”23 
sounding the death knell of  the genetic determinist paradigm. 
Malabou deftly uncovers the scientific backbone of  eugen-
ics to demonstrate how the science of  policing “gives way to spy-
ing, which, in turn, gives way to cybernetics,”24 developing a line 
of  complicity between techniques of  intelligence assessment and 
today’s ‘intelligent machines.’ Mehdi Helhaj Kacem once justly 
praised Malabou for her fascinating coincidence of  the ontologi-
cal/transcendental with the “crudest empiricity,”25 and Morphing 
Intelligence is by no means an exception. Just as she refuses “sepa-
rating mind and brain,”26 Malabou has, in her “heretical appro-
priation of  Heidegger,”27 also tied being with event, cognition with 
causality. In Morphing Intelligence, we see Malabou’s unique ability to 
mend empirical studies and  neuroscience with biopolitics, Hege-
lian dialectics and Kantian transcendentalism, weaving an elabo-
rate, albeit coherent, arachnean matrix. 
Within contemporary continental thought, Malabou up-
ends philosophy’s espousal of  an exclusionary relationship between 
science and art, or between science and ideology. Thus, Malabou’s 
bricolage-methodology is evident in Morphing Intelligence, as she an-
chors her critique of  intelligence in historical instances of  biology 
while withdrawing from biologism. In comparison to her many 
philosophical colleagues and predecessors, Malabou provides a 
singular style and approach to the philosophical dimensions of  
scientific knowledge, making use of  its insights without rejecting 
or falling prey to them. In this light, Malabou may quite possibly 
proves herself  as the post-continental philosopher par excellence, re-
taining her Derridean poetic roots while gesturing towards ana-
lytic Anglophone philosophy’s penchant for empirical modeling 
(illustrated in her instrumentalization of  neurobiology and John 
23   Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 60.
24  Ibid., 47.
25   Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, Transgression and the Inexistent, trans. P. Burcu 
Yalim (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 211.
26   Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), xiii.
27  Medhi Belhaj Kacem, Transgression and the Inexistent, 211.
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Dewey’s pragmatism).
Malabou’s approach demonstrates the challenge of  situ-
ating ‘intelligence’ as an object of  unambiguous empirical study. 
Almost impossible to define univocally, ‘intelligence’—in its most 
pernicious expropriation—has been used to constitute genetic pre-
destinations and legitimate dangerous social hierarchies. Perhaps 
Edgar Morin best abridged intelligence, remarking that “[i]ntelli-
gence is not only what tests measure; it is also what eludes them.”28 
In problematizing intelligence as strictly empirical and bio-
logically determined, Malabou also troubles the traditional dis-
tinction between intelligence and intuition rife in the continental 
philosophical tradition. This division is perhaps best exemplified 
by Bergson’s analysis of  intellectual measurement magnitudes in 
his appeal to intensity, and intensity alone.29 Malabou characterizes 
this fetid standstill as little more than provincialism: “[a]fter Berg-
son, no truly new argument was offered to counter intelligence 
as defined by psychologists and biologists, including the most 
recent cognitivist version [....] it is seriously outdated and is not 
productive.”30 Echoing Georges Canguilhem, Malabou castigates 
psychology’s instrumentalist regard for intelligence, since it is able 
to measure only the human ability to “become an instrument.”31 
Malabou contends that Alfred Binet (who heavily critiqued Berg-
son) had it right—intelligence is constituted by intensities and qual-
ities. 
Appealing to Hume via Deleuze’s Empiricism and Subjectiv-
ity (1977), Bourdieu’s physiological description of  intelligence as 
‘conditionability’ also proves to be helpful: “to speak of  disposi-
tions is simply to take note of  a natural predisposition of  human 
bodies, the only one […] that a rigorous anthropology is entitled 
to assume, a conditionability in the sense of  a natural capacity to 
28  Edgar Morin, La méthode 3. La connaissance de la connaissance (Paris: 
Seuil, 1986), 75.
29  Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of  
Consciousness (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001).
30  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 39-40.
31  Ibid., 44.
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acquire non-natural, arbitrary capacities.”32 Bourdieu’s theory of  
epigenesis by synaptic stabilization, whereby brain development 
continues long after birth and is largely dependent on environ-
mental and cultural input, challenges innatism. How does this 
fact arm Malabou’s notion of  “programmable and programmed 
plasticity”?33 The mediation of  the physical states of  the brain are 
closely connected to the social posture of  the body. Such is the role 
of  ‘habitus,’ which “restores to the agent a generating, unifying, 
constructing, classifying power, while recalling that this capacity”34 
is that of  a socialized body. 
Socialization is the bright beacon of  Malabou’s optimism—
she points to synaptic chips, both synchronic and diachronic, en-
dowed with their own plastic form of  intelligence. Indeed, the 
plastic autonomy of  artificial intelligence means that “[m]achines 
will invent epigenetic (self-)manipulation.”35 Does the death of  the 
author/birth of  the scripter have a cybernetic future? If  so, Mala-
bou presents us with a means by which intelligent machines can 
not only reinvent themselves but also cast the descriptor ‘intelli-
gence’ of  its static mold.
Shifting from the more marked political-economic exigen-
cies of  What Should We Do With Our Brain?, Morphing Intelligence mo-
tions towards a variegated pragmatic terrain. For instance, Mal-
abou lifts John Dewey’s assertion that intelligence is opposed to 
automatism and that there is an initial “social incorporation of  the 
subject” destined to be “invested in by the cogs of  power” while, 
simultaneously, “freeing itself  from this grip through the ‘method 
of  intelligence.’”36 In singular fashion, Malabou pits Dewey practi-
cal inscription of  time against Bergson, for whom duration is solely 
the companion of  intuition. With the help of  Dewey’s automa-
tism—whereby “[i]ntelligence is able to interrupt its own routine 
32  Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 136.
33  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 91.
34  Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 136-137.
35  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 90.
36  Ibid., 101.
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without becoming anything other than an automatism”37—Mala-
bou is able to conceive of  intelligence within a collective social 
domain, disentangled from the wraithlike coercive machinery of  
biopolitics. 
Malabou demonstrates that, consequently, it is automatism 
that allows plasticity to occupy the intersection between the brain 
and cybernetic arrangements. Given the relationship between 
computer logic and postmodernity,38 the enumerative stasis of  Big 
Data has dominated cultural discourse, which has focused on the 
decentered, networked tenets of  the global present. Citing senti-
ment analysis, data-mining sociality,39 and “instant revisionism”40 
evinces the erosion between the “real and the virtual.”41 However, 
Malabou provides a new model of  contingency: that of  the neuro-
computer and the “plastic brain,” where the “brain and computer 
have a reciprocal and ‘mirroring’ relationship.”42 Importing the 
resistance of  automatism to itself  (automatism’s “immanent con-
tradiction,” able to “survive its own traumas”),43 Malabou illumi-
nates conditions beyond the rigid functional mechanisms of  the 
database, honing in on that which is creative and unpredictable 
(rather than predetermined and calculable). 
Malabou, the keen historian, uncovers that this determin-
ability is, in fact, dormant in cybernetic historiography. American 
pragmatist William James once wrote that “[p]lasticity, in the wid-
est sense of  the word, means the possession of  a structure weak 
enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all 
at once.”44 Hence, the paradoxical power of  “cybernetic plastic-
37  Ibid., 108.
38  Lev Manovich, “Database as Symbolic Form”, Convergence: The Inter-
national Journal of  Research into New Media Technologies 5 (1999), 80-99.
39  Mark Andrejevic, InfoGlut: How too Much Information is Changing the Way 
We think and Know (Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2013), 88.
40  Bruno Latour, “Why has Critique Run out of  Steam? From Matters 
of  Fact to Matters of  Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30 (Winter 2004), 230.
41  Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of  the Internet (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 39.
42  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 115.
43  Ibid., 117.
44  William James, The Principles of  Psychology (Boston: Harvard Univer-
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ity” resides in its fragility.45 Stimulated by James’ passages on the 
rigid machine mediated by the open-ended, adaptive structure of  
the organic nervous system, W. Ross Ashby sought for a machine 
endowed with regenerative plasticity, or the brain as “error-con-
trolled regulator.”46 
Equally invigorated by neurophysiologist Charles Sher-
rington’s work on neural integration and environmental milieu—
particularly how the machine’s “threshold of  reaction” is sensi-
tively attuned to reaction via its environment47—Ashby hoped to 
construct a machine whose determinate structure was capable of  
reorganization. Alan Turing’s notes on an ‘infallible’ machine, si-
multaneously ‘intelligent’ in its “departure from the completely 
disciplined behavior involved in computation […] which does not 
give rise to random behavior, or to pointless repetitive loops,”48 
demonstrate the viability of  mechanical pathology and regenera-
tion, which Canguilhem neglected in “Machine and Organism.”49 
Delineating a collective closure between cybernetics, pragmatic 
ethics, and genetic structuralism, Malabou arrives at a working 
definition of  intelligence as “that which opposes the power of  the 
automatism to the automatism of  power,”50 accounting for both 
sapience and machine intelligence.
Malabou therefore asserts the power of  the plasticity of  
automation, buttressing Simondon’s declaration that “the human 
being is a rather dangerous automaton, who is always risking in-
vention,” corresponding to the automaton’s operation behind a 
sity Press, 2007), 64
45  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 117.
46   W. Ross Ashby, Mechanisms of  Intelligence: Ross Ashby’s Writings on Cy-
bernetics, ed. Roger Conant (Cambridge, MA: Intersystems Publications, 1981), 
190
47  Charles S. Sherrington, The Integrative Action of  the Nervous System (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1906), 309.
48  Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 49, 
(1950): 459.
49  Georges Canguilhem, “Machine and Organism” (1947), in Incor-
porations, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter, trans. Mark Cohen and 
Randall Cherry (New York: Zone Books, 1992).
50  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 101.
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veiled “margin of  indetermination.”51 Malabou’s distances herself  
from the qualification between machine and organism that Kant 
voices in “The Critique of  Teleological Judgment,” where Kant 
makes the formative distinction that, in a machine, parts exist for 
the other but not because of  the other.52 For Kant, the human, in 
contrast, possesses intentionality in its transformational energy, us-
ing it to propagate itself  (Kant echoes this position in the “Critique 
of  Aesthetic Judgment” when writing on art). Malabou compels us 
not to choose one ‘ideal’ model within the brain/machine dialectic 
but, instead, to embrace the simultaneity of  epigenetic becoming 
fostered in the espoused tension of  ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ intel-
ligence. A poetic paradox transpires with the ‘digital brain,’ resting 
on its margin of  indeterminacy, as “[t]o be intelligent is to look 
from many sides simultaneously.”53
Drawing on the plasticity of  technical intelligence and de-
velopmental psychologist Howard Gardner’s theory of  multiple 
intelligences (linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, spatial, 
bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal),54 Mala-
bou determines that the problem of  intelligence can no longer 
be circumscribed by psychology, biology or cybernetics, or some 
definite ‘super-science’ comprising them all. Given this plurality, 
Malabou also points to Pierre Lévy’s concept of  ‘collective intelli-
gence,’ to synthesize an understanding of  intelligence in ultimately 
social terms, rested on the “new type of  materiality” prompted 
by the technologically reconfigured “virtual community.”55 Lévy 
demonstrates how internetworked data can “provide the techni-
cal infrastructure for the collective brain or hypercortex of  living 
51 Gilbert Simondon, “Chapters 1 and 2” in On the Mode of  Existence of  
Technical Objects, trans. Ninian Mellamphy. (London, Canada: University of  
Western Ontario, [1958] 1980), 3.
52 Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: 
Hafner Press, 1951), 22.
53  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 109.
54  Howard Hardner, Frames of  Mind: The Theory of  Multiple Intelligences 
(New York: Basic Books, 1983), 44.
55  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 124.
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communities.”56 Using her amended model of  plasticity, Malabou 
affronts the internal dialectical opposition between autonomous 
and automatic intelligence, engaging the tension between “a uni-
formization and normalization of  behavior versus equality and the 
sharing of  intelligence.”57 
Concerned with the future of  education and the prolifera-
tion of  ‘neuroknowledge’ barometers, Malabou asks us whether 
‘collective intelligence’ can be “distributed among the different 
fields of  knowledge without reestablishing new hegemonies and 
new centers?”58 Progressing through this line of  questioning, Mal-
abou tarries the field of  future studies, questioning our possible 
technological and intelligent futures. Examining both technopho-
bic and technophilic fantasies of  future intelligence, Malabou ul-
timately opts for a model of  horizontal intelligence wrested from 
biological determination and the particularly vocal technopolitical 
hysteria voiced by today’s tech corporations and their reactionar-
ies. 
For Malabou, both fantasies of  a fixed horizon of  intelli-
gence and delusions of  an autonomous community of  machines 
(for good or ill) are simply not viable. ‘Automatic creation,’ on the 
other hand, is, although this venture will solely be capable of  a 
“political platform and ethical texture” if  we endow it with one.59 
Malabou calls for decisional “intersubjectivity,”60 or transparent 
and communal legislative advancements regarding algorithmic 
development that are voted upon by the masses, rather than co-
vertly decided on by the same tech companies that these decisions 
benefit. This necessitates a kind of  human transformation to ac-
company an epochal plasticity of  laws, ethics, and mentalities.
While Morphing Intelligence provides a keen revision to the ex-
clusively ‘human’ terms of  plasticity proposed in What Should we 
do With our Brain?, it also presents a new fulcrum with which to 
56  Pierre Lévy, Collective Intelligence: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace 
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1999), 9-10. 
57  Catherine Malabou, Morphing Intelligence, 128.
58  Ibid., 128.
59  Ibid., 161.
60  Ibid., 162.
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re-perspectivize ‘intelligence,’ both human and machine. Thomas 
Nagel once anchored the epiphenomenal qualia of  subjectivity 
within consciousness, eloquently destabilizing materialist proclivi-
ties in philosophy of  mind. 61 In parallel, Malabou extends an irre-
ducibly creative and aleatory subjectivity to machine intelligence. 
Citing algorithms that are implicated in qualitative activities such as 
artistic creation and improvisation, as exemplified by AlphaGo—
the ‘deep learning’ machine that won the 2016 world Go champi-
onship—Malabou identifies the subtlety of  algorithmic calculation 
today as the capability of  “simulating noncalculation.”62 
In Morphing Intelligence, Malabou eruditely maps impera-
tives appropriately situated within contemporary sociopolitical 
discourse. In April 2019, the European Union published “Ethics 
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI,” legislating a set of  requirements 
that AI systems need to meet in order to be deemed above sus-
picion.63 Following San Francisco’s recent decision to ban local 
police agencies from using facial recognition technologies, Sense-
Time, China’s most profitable artificial intelligence start-up com-
pany, has called on governments to establish new regulations for 
facial recognition systems instead of  banning them all together. 
Such contentious judgments, equally embroiled with human rights 
and algorithmic programming, will become increasingly critical 
for public involvement. Morphing Intelligence gestures towards the 
eminent legislative and ethical concerns framing a participatory 
digital democracy, bioethics, surveillance and the dangers of  a di-
vided transhumanist universalism permeating our not-so-distant 
future. 
61  Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, The Philosophical 
Review 84.3 (1974), 435-450.
62  Catherine Malabou, Morhing Intelligence, 148. 
63  Maroš Šefčovič, “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI,” (2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trust-
worthy-ai. Retrieved May 24, 2019.
